State v. Fencl Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 41985 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-17-2014
State v. Fencl Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41985
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Fencl Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41985" (2014). Not Reported. 1875.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1875
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
SARAH JOANN FENCL, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
________ ) 
NO. 41985 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2013-10572 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE LYNN NORTON 
District Judge 
SARA 8. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7259 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
.•.... ---, r· .. ,--·- .{ \ 
1 : 
L~o~~~ ' 
Suprem" ci, . .rt.--:-}":·.1,iit u1 hppeals-
En\:iea on 1~1 ~;, t·y .. ---
---
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 3 
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing 
And In Denying The Rule 35 Motion, When It Failed To 
Recognize That The Persistent Violator Statute Did Not 
Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of 
Five Years Fixed, But A Minimum Unified Sentence 
Of Five Years ............................................................................................. 3 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 3 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing 
And In Denying The Rule 35 Motion, When It Failed To 
Recognize That The Persistent Violator Statute Did 
Not Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence 
Of Five Years Fixed, But A Minimum Unified Sentence 
Of Five Years ........................................................................................ 3 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................. 7 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................................... passim 
Statutes 
Idaho Code §19-2514 ........................................................................................... 3 
Rules 
Rule 35 .............................................................................................................. i, 5 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sarah Joann Fencl appeals from the district court's Judgment and Commitment. 
Following her guilty pleas to driving under the influence and being a persistent violator, 
she was sentenced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her both 
because it failed to realize that the minimum five year sentence for a persistent violator 
enhancement does not require the five years be a fixed term and because it sentenced 
her to an excessive sentence when it imposed sentence without giving proper weight or 
consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in this case. Furthermore, Ms. Fencl 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion because the district court clearly continued to 
misunderstand what minimum sentence is required when a defendant is subject to a 
persistent violator enhancement. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that the district 
court was aware that a sentence enhanced by a persistent violator enhancement does 
not need to contain a minimum five year fixed sentence as evidenced by the district 
court's knowledge of State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Fencl's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES1 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion, both at sentencing and in denying the 
Ru!e 35 motion, when it failed to recognize that the persistent violator statute did 
not require the imposition of a minimum sentence of five years fixed, but a 
minimum unified sentence of five years? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Ms. Fencl, a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, following her pleas of guilty 
to driving under the influence and a persistent violator enhancement? 
1 Ms. Fencl does not believe that any reply is necessary on the second issue because 
the State's argument on this issue is unremarkable. 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing And In Denying The Rule 
35 ~11otion, When It Failed To Recognize That The Persistent Violator Statute Did Not 
Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of Five Years Fixed, But A Minimum 
Unified Sentence Of Five Years 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court believed that it had to sentence her to a 
minimum fixed sentence of five years because of her plea of guilty to a persistent 
violator enhancement. Idaho Code §·19-2514, the persistent violator statute, provides 
that a sentence enhanced by the persistent violator enhancement must receive a 
minimum five year sentence, not a minimum five year fixed sentence. The district 
court's belief that it must impose a minimum of five years fixed was misplaced and, 
ultimately, led to an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing And In Denying The 
Rule 35 Motion, When It Failed To Recognize That The Persistent Violator 
Statute Did Not Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of Five Years 
Fixed, But A Minimum Unified Sentence Of Five Years 
On appeal, the State notes that the district court referenced State v. Toyne, 151 
Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011 ), specifically at the change of plea hearing. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.6 (citing Tr., p7, Ls.9-19.) The State has asserted that, "In light of the district 
court's expressed knowledge of this case, Fencl cannot show that the district court 
actually misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.7.) Ms. Fencl asserts that this reliance is misplaced based on statements made by 
the district court following the change of plea hearing which suggest that despite the 
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court's knowledge of Toyne it did not understand that only a five year unified sentence 
was required. 
Certainly, the State is correct that Toyne holds that, "The statute requires only a 
unified sentence of at least five years and such sentence may, in the court's discretion, 
be suspended." Id. at 783. The district court clearly articulated that it was aware of 
Toyne. (Tr., p., Ls.9-19.) However, at the change of plea hearing, the district court 
limited its discussion of Toyne and stated only that it understood it could suspend the 
sentence. (Tr., p. 7, Ls.14-19.) Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, the district court 
acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to suspend the sentence, but again did not 
specifically discuss whether or not the court was aware that the persistent violator 
enhancement required imposition of only a unified sentence of a minimum of five years. 
(Tr., p.32, L.4 - p.33, L.10.) 
In fact, despite the district court's statement that it was aware of Toyne, it made 
statements that imply that it did not recognize the full holding of the Toyne opinion. The 
district court's statements show that it understood it could suspend the sentence, but 
raised concerns that the court was unaware the required five year sentence was not a 
requirement for a minimum five year fixed sentence. During sentencing, the district 
court noted that "[g]iven the persistent violator enhancement, it limits the sentences that 
I can impose since I am imposing a prison sentence in this case." (Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.) 
The district court then imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
(Tr., p.33, Ls.6-10.) The statement from the district court suggests that it may have 
believed it had to impose a fixed term of five years. 
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Later, in denying Ms. Fencl's Rule 35 motion, in which she specifically noted 
concerns that the district court had believed it's sentencing discretion was more limited 
than it actually was and requested a reduction of her five year fixed term, the district 
court stated that, "[t]he Defendant's motion for reconsideration acknowledges a fixed 
term of five years was required but asks the court, in its discretionary [sic], for leniency 
in a reduction of the indeterminate portion of the sentence." (R., pp.106-108.) 
This shows that the district court incorrectly believed, not only that Ms. Fencl had 
conceded that a five year fixed sentence is required, but that the persistent violator 
statue requires a minimum fixed five year sentence. These statements raise serious 
concerns that, while the district court was aware of Toyne and clearly understood it 
could suspend Ms. Fencl's sentence, it did not understand that it could also impose a 
lesser fixed period as long as the sentence was a minimum, unified, five year term. As 
such, despite the district court's mentioning of the Toyne opinion, the district court later 
statements show that it clearly did not recognize that it had the discretion to impose a 
lesser fixed sentence. 
The State has also asserted that, "However, in the alternative, even if the district 
court misperceived its sentencing discretion, it is clear from the record that any such 
misunderstanding did not actually impact the court's sentencing determination or denial 
of Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion. Any such error is therefore harmless." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.7.) Ms. Fencl asserts that this is incorrect. Again, at the sentencing hearing, the 
district court noted that "[g]iven the persistent violator enhancement, it limits the 
sentences that I can impose since I am imposing a prison sentence in this case." 
(Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.) The fact that the district court then imposed, what it presumably 
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believed was the minimum required fixed term, five years, shows that the district court 
was considering the least severe fixed sentence possible. Therefore, we cannot know 
what the fixed term of imprisonment may have been if the district court had correctly 
recognized that it had discretion to impose a lesser fixed sentence. The district court 
was unable to effectively apply its sentencing discretion and, as such, the State has 
failed to meet its burden to prove the error is harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Fencl respectfully requests that this Court remand her case for a new 
sentencing hearing in which the district court must consider the proper application of the 
persistent violator enhancement. Alternatively, she requests that the order denying her 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it 
deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1J1h day of November, 2014. 
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